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EQUITY JURISDICTION IN PROBATE MATTERS
UNDER THE NEW CODE
LESLIE A. WELCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The reliance of the court in the recent case of In re Frech's Estate'
upon various judicial opinions rendered before the new 1955 probate
code, in which Missouri courts, by sweeping declarations, denied or
greatly restricted the equity or equitable jurisdiction of Missouri
probate courts in probate matters, suggests the need of a prompt,
thorough re-examination of such declarations. Neither the opinion
nor briefs of counsel in Frech mentioned Section 472.030 or any of the
other hereinafter referred to sections of the new probate code. Section
472.030, following the lead of the Model Probate Code,2 provides
that the court "has the same legal and equitable powers to effectuate
its jurisdiction ... in probate matters as the circuit court has in
other matters . . .
Necessarily, the re-examination should be made in the light of: (1)
the attempt of the legislature in the new code to terminate the con-
flicts, confusion and uncertainty on the subject which existed under
the old code; (2) the 1945 constitutional requirement that all probate
judges be lawyers4 (instead of only those in counties of over 50,000
population); (3) the recognition of the power of the General As-
sembly to pass "practical and common sense statutes" in probate
* Probate Judge, Jackson County, Missouri.
1. 347 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. 1961).
2. Model Probate Code § 6 (Simes 1946). See also Rheinstein, The Model
Probate Code: A Critique, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 534, 536 (1948); Niles, Model
Probate Code and Monograms on Probate Law: A Review, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 321,
324 (1947).
3. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 472.030 (1959). Unless otherwise indicated herein, all
section references are to 1959 Mo. Rev. Stat.
4. Mo. Const. art. V, § 25 (1945).
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matters ;5 and (4) the fact that probate court hearings can be speedily
had, and that its decrees are usually accepted as final and not appealed.
But if appeal is desired, trial de novo in circuit court is always avail-
able, and frequently such trial can be had as soon as, or sooner than
an action originally filed there.
Depite a long-standing grant to probate courts of jurisdiction over
"all matters pertaining to probate business,",, prior to the 1955 pro-
bate code the power of these courts over the administration of estates
was severely limited by numerous judicial decisions and pronounce-
ments to the effect that they had no "equitable" jurisdiction. The more
than forty case discussions of this subject were, in the aggregate,
confusing and contradictory. And their effect was such that probate
courts were plagued with innumerable controversies involving their
jurisdiction, and the necessity of filing and trying "equitable" probate
matters in other courts delayed and added greatly to the expense of
many estate administrations.
The drafters of the new code were well aware of this unfortunate
state of affairs. They proposed to correct it by giving full imple-
mentation, equitable as well as legal, to the courts' jurisdiction over
all matters pertaining to probate business.
It was hoped that Section 472.030 and the other jurisdictional sec-
tions of the new code would put an end to the various uncertainties
concerning jurisdiction, and that the courts' powers, in the probate
field, would thenceforth be regarded as plenary. After the adoption
of the code, it remained to be seen to what extent the courts would
recognize and sanction the legislative intent.
The first post-code case to discuss this subject was North v. Haw-
kinson,7 in which one of the two opinions stated that while the probate
court does not have the "general equity jurisdiction of circuit courts,"
it does have "plenary equity jurisdiction of 'matters pertaining to
probate business.'" However, whatever satisfaction the proponents of
the broadened probate court powers under the new code derived from
this language was short-lived, and somewhat abruptly terminated by
the decision and opinion in Frech, which disregards this aspect of the
new code.
The Frech case was a discovery proceeding to recover what admit-
tedly were at one time assets of an inter-vivos trust established by the
decedent. The administrator contended, and the defendant-trustee
denied, that the trust had been revoked prior to the decedent's death
and the assets were therefore a part of his estate. The supreme
5. Parsons v. Harvey, 281 Mo. 413, 427, 221 S.W. 21, 25 (1920).
6. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 481.020 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 472.020
(1959).
7. 324 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1959).
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court, relying solely on cases antedating the new code, held that the
probate court lacked jurisdiction to decide the question of revocation,
and stated that since the matter involved a trust it was "equitable"
and that,
the probate court... is without power to entertain a suit or pro-
ceeding based on strictly equitable principles . . . unless such
jurisdiction is expressly conferred by a statute or is necessarily
incident to the proper exercise of duties directly imposed.8
It is primarily the Frech case which prompts this article. It was
thought by the code's drafters that after the new code became effective
those old cases concerning jurisdiction of equitable matters would
thenceforth have only historical significance. The F'rech. opinion
nevertheless proceeds as if the new code had never been adopted,
citing as its authority and quoting with approval many of those old
cases; resurrecting them, as it were, from the legal limbo to which, it
was hoped by many, they had been permanently consigned.9
A third case, Courier v. Scott,"' decided in June, 1960 is also of
significance in determining probate court jurisdiction under the new
code, even though the supreme court held that it involved no equitable
issue. The Courier case involved a declaratory judgment action filed in
the circuit court by a widower against the administrator of his wife's
estate and her heirs. The husband claimed the right to retain the
proceeds of a bank account standing in the name of his wife when she
died, which proceeds the bank thereafter delivered to the husband;
and also to recover United States bonds purchased by the wife with
funds withdrawn by her from said account. The circuit court ad-
judged that the husband was the owner of $10,000 of the bank ac-
count, that his wife's estate was the owner of $212.20 thereof and that
the husband "is the equitable owner of the bonds ... and is entitled
to the proceeds of the same."" The supreme court reversed the judg-
ment and, ex mero motu, directed a dismissal of the suit on the ground
that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction of the same issues
in a prior discovery proceeding filed and pending in the probate court.
Thus, the foregoing introduction indicates not only a continuation
of the pre-code uncertainty and controversy as to probate court equity
powers, but a probable increased confusion. Hence, this article, after
brief reference to constitutionality, will explore the statutes and de-
cisions pro and con before the new code, and the many changes in the
law intended to be effected by the code.
8. In re Frech's Estate, 347 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Mo. 1961).
9. For further discussion of In re Frech see notes 76 and 78 infra.
10. 336 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. 1960).
11. This quoted portion of the circuit court judgment does not appear in the
appellate court opinion.
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Constitutionality
Because neither Frech, Courier nor North considered the constitu-
tionality of a legislative grant of equitable powers to the probate
court in probate matters, this article will not extensively explore that
question. Two prior articles 12 have partially done so. In the second
of these it was contended that the General Assembly is wholly without
constitutional power to vest in the probate courts any equitable power
whatsoever. For the purposes of this article, let it suffice to observe
that if such contention were sound, then the vast majority of the
functions of Missouri probate courts now and heretofore exercised
are and have been unconstitutional. That would be true not only as
to specific grants of jurisdiction, such as actions for the specific per-
formance of contracts of decedents to sell real estate, and other actions
hereinafter noted, but also as to the general equitable powers neces-
sarily involved in the winding up of the affairs of deceased persons
and the handling of the affairs of persons under disability.
The only constitutional limitation upon the power of the legislature
to regulate the exercise of the jurisdiction or judicial power vested in
the probate courts by Article V, Section 1 of the 1945 Missouri Con-
stitution, is that imposed by Sections 16 and 17 of the same Article.
Section 1 provides that, "The judicial power of the state shall be
vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, circuit courts, probate
courts...." The limitation of Section 16 is only that the jurisdiction
of probate courts shall be "of all matters pertaining to probate
business ..... " The Section specifically enumerates only four of such
matters, viz., granting of letters, appointment of guardians, settling
accounts, and sale or leasing of lands. The limitation of Section 17
is that such courts shall be "uniform in their organization, jurisdic-
tion and practice. .. ." Since the Missouri constitution, unlike the
federal constitution, is not one of delegated powers, all lawmaling
power is reserved to the General Assembly except as limited by the
constitution.13
Except for loose and unnecessary language in some opinions, it will
be found on careful analysis that the judicial limitations heretofore
placed on probate court jurisdiction in probate matters have been
based on absence of statutory, not constitutional, authority. One con-
tention of lack of constitutional authority'4 has been based upon the
action and comments of the delegates at the 1945 convention in reject-
ing a proposal to place in the constitution a provision making an
12. Welch, Oliver, Jr., & Summers, Constitutionality of The Broadened Powers
of The Probate Court in Missouri Under The New Code, 23 Mo. L. Rev. 113,
140 (1958); 5 St. Louis U.L.J. 578 (1959).
13. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 70, p. 191 n.84 (1956) (Mo. cases cited).
14. See 5 St. Louis U.L.J. 578 (1959).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/1
EQUITY JURISDICTION
exception to the uniformity of jurisdiction provision in the constitu-
tion; to-wit, that in certain counties only, probate courts should have
jurisdiction over such legal and equitable actions as might be provided
by law.15 Although the action and comments of the delegates may un-
doubtedly add to the confusion on the subject (some of such comments
are obviously of doubtful accuracy), it is well to bear in mind that the
Judiciary Committee of the convention was striving mightily to retain
the nonpartisan court plan. As a part of this effort, the committee
was endeavoring to avoid controversies and to maintain the status
quo on questions of constitutional jurisdiction of the appellate, circuit
and probate courts. Hence, it may well be that many votes opposing
the proposed amendment were based on a belief that the legislature al-
ready had the power to vest in the probate courts equitable jurisdic-
tion in probate matters, and that rather than making specific provision
therefor in the constitution, it would be wiser to leave this matter for
the legislature. Other negative votes may have been based upon the
belief that the proposal was undesirable because inconsistent with the
uniformity provision.
Significance also has been attached 6 to the fact that in 1945 the del-
egates appended to the end of Section 16 the clause, "and of such other
matters as are provided in this constitution." At first blush it might
be thought that such words impose a limitation upon the legislature
not existing under the jurisdictional clause in the 1875 constitution
(the latter otherwise being the same as that of 1945, insofar as perti-
nent here). In truth, this clause was added as a result of a misconcep-
tion of the convention delegates that the clause was necessary or advis-
able because two sections later it is provided that in counties of 30,000
inhabitants or less, the probate judge should also be judge of the
magistrate court. 7 It is clear that the fact that the two courts were
nevertheless to be separate and distinct was completely overlooked,
for there were no other matters provided in the constitution pertain-
ing to probate court jurisdiction.-i
In 1920 the supreme court held constitutional the so-called "refusal
of letters" statute9 which authorized the probate court to transfer
15. Debates, Missouri Constitutional Convention p. 2623 (1943-44).
16. 5 St. Louis U.L.J. 578 (1959).
17. Mo. Const. art. V, § 18 (1945).
18. If this added clause were construed as limiting the legislature to only
such probate matters as are specifically enumerated in the constitution, very
little of the probate jurisdiction exercised by probate courts for 135 years could
be continued. See Welch, Oliver, Jr., & Summers, supra note 12 at 119-20, for a
list of the statutes vesting jurisdiction in probate courts not within any specific
enumeration in the constitution, and the validity of which hinge upon the clause,
"all matters pertaining to probate business."
19. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 2 (1919), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.090 (1959).
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title to personal property to decedent's surviving spouse without ad-
ministration, although the power was not within the specific wording
of the jurisdiction section of the constitution. The court said,
It is manifest that section 34 of article 6 of our Constitution
confers upon probate courts complete jurisdiction over all matters
pertaining to probate business. There is nothing in our Consti-
tution which forbids the General Assembly from passing practical
and common sense statutes, like section 10, supra .... 20
In 1947 Judge Ellison in State ex rel. Kowats v. Arnold,21 com-
menting that "Sec. 16, Art. V, Const. 1945 is not by any means as
clear and definite as we might wish, 22 held constitutional statutes
empowering the probate court not only to commit persons of unsound
mind to the state hospitals, but also to impose liability on the county
for their care. Necessarily such statutes depended for their validity
upon the construction of the phrase in Section 16, "jurisdiction of all
matters pertaining to probate business .... ,123
Obviously, then, the validity of the great bulk of the probate
statutes has been based upon this general phrase, "jurisdiction of all
matters pertaining to probate business." Hence, further consideration
of constitutionality in this article would be superfluous.
II. THE MOVEMENT FOR PROBATE COURT REFORM
What was the probate court jurisdictional picture when in 1955
Missouri undertook to enact a new probate code? A study of the
history of probate court organization and jurisdiction throughout
the nation and England leads only to a bewildering morass of statu-
tory and judicial philosophy varying from state to state and in in-
dividual states from time to time.24 Missouri has been no exception.
As long ago as 1898 it was said of the Missouri probate code by an
eminent authority that it had become "refined upon and loaded down
with multitudinous and heterogeneous amendments, to which every
session of the Legislature has diligently contributed. 125
In England, probate court organization and jurisdiction were
completely overhauled in 1857. However, notwithstanding an ever
growing discontent in the United States with our archaic probate
laws-conceived to serve the needs of an agricultural economy when
20. Parsons v. Harvey, 281 Mo. 413, 427, 221 S.W. 21, 25 (1920).
21. 356 Mo. 661, 204 S.W.2d 254 (1947).
22. Id. at 670, 204 S.W.2d at 258.
23. Mo. Const. art. V, § 16 (1945). The only relevant specific powers there
authorized were appointment of guardians and curators and the settling of their
accounts.
24. Model Probate Code 385-488 (Simes 1946).
25. Welch, Oliver, Jr., & Summers, supra note 12, at 114 n.1.
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it ordinarily required a day to travel a distance now traveled in thirty
minutes or less-the sporadic advocacy for reform made little prog-
ress until the 1930's. Ohio in 1931, Florida in 1933, Minnesota in
1935, Illinois, Kansas and Michigan in 1939 adopted new probate
codes which represented varying degrees of progress, but much
remained to be done. New York and Pennsylvania had greatly im-
proved their probate court organizational and jurisdictional picture
in the urban areas.
But it was not until 1939, when Professor Atkinson wrote a series
of articles,2 1 that the advocacy for reform induced the American Bar
Association to take substantial action in the matter. At its instance,
the University of Michigan Law School, under the supervision of
Professors Simes and Atkinson and Mr. Paul E. Basye, commenced
research which culminated in the publication of extensive articles,27
and the presentment in 1947 by the Probate Law Division of the
American Bar Association of a proposed Model Probate Code.2 The
picture was clearly portrayed in Professor Atkinson's articles.2 9
26. Atkinson, Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications of Probate
Judges, 23 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 93 (1939) ; Atkinson, Old Principles and New Ideas
Concerning Probate Court Procedure, 23 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 137 (1939); Atkinson,
Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 183 (1940).
27. Basye, Dispensing with Administration, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 329 (1945);
Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: II, 43 Mich.
L. Rev. 113 (1944); Basye, The Venue of Probate and Administration Proceed-
ings, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1944); Simes & Basye, The Organization of the
Probate Court in America, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 965 (1944).
28. Model Probate Code (Simes 1946).
29. Atkinson, Organization of Probate Courts and Qualifications of Probate
Judges, 23 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 93, 94 (1939), wherein it is said:
The position of the probate courts in the judicial hierarchy was indeed a
curious one. Vested with the combined powers of the English ecclesiastical
courts to probate wills and grant letters of administration, and of the Court
of Chancery to administer estates, they were generally declared to be courts
of record and in this respect the equal of the supreme and ordinary trial
courts....
While it is still desirable that probate courts should be close at hand, im-
proved transportation and communication facilities make a given distance
much less material than formerly. The amount of property passing through
administration has greatly increased in the last half century. Due to
changes in the financial structure property rights are frequently of a more
complex and perplexing nature. To cite a single example of this, personal
representatives and courts of probate are often confronted with problems
of exercise, sale or lapse of rights attached to corporate stock owned by
decedents. In addition, the jurisdiction of probate courts has increased.
Almost everywhere they pass on claims against the estate and construe wills
in ordering distribution. In many states probate courts assign or distribute
realty, and of late some of them have been given general equitable powers,
jurisdiction to administer testamentary trusts, and some authority over
claims in favor of the estate.
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Much of the groundwork for the probate reform in Missouri had
been laid by the drafters of the 1945 constitution, which required that
all probate judges (except incumbents) be lawyers. 0 The criticism
which for years had been directed at Missouri's probate laws
prompted the legislature, in 1953, to establish The Joint Probate Laws
Revision Committee to "make a complete and detailed study of pro-
bate procedure and.. .formulate a system of practice and procedure in
the probate courts [to] ... meet the needs of modern society." 1
During the two years that the Joint Legislative Committee was
engaged in drafting a proposed new probate code, it appeared that one
of the most frustrating aspects of probate court procedure had been
the recurring litigation over the question of the equitable powers of
a Missouri probate court.3 2 In practice under the old codes, equitable
relief was granted intermittently for more than a century without
challenge-sometimes with express statutory authority, sometimes
with implied statutory authority, and sometimes simply because it
was assumed to be a proper function of the court in winding up the
temporal affairs of a dead person, a proceeding inherently equitable
in nature and one which originated in courts of chancery. Judicial
pronouncements on the subject were from time to time altered,
modified, explained and criticized, until there evolved in the cases
what has been termed the "vague abstraction that although the
[probate] courts have no general equity jurisdiction, equitable prin-
Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 183, 187 (1940),
wherein it is said:
Due no doubt to the fact that laymen probate judges are not versed in
equity, it is sometimes held that they have no equitable jurisdiction, yet in
the same breath the courts declare that the probate court should proceed
in an equitable manner. What are the implications of such a statement?
On its face at least, proceeding like a court of equity without being one
seems to be a sort of apologetic play-acting.
The writer does not mean to infer that all of these matters are in a state
of uncertainty in every jurisdiction. Probably everywhere a practitioner
can be sure of something more than that he must present an ordinary ma-
tured debt claim, or be barred save for exceptional circumstances; but he is
fortunate indeed who can answer all of the above questions even after a
careful study of the statutes and decisions in his jurisdiction.
See also Pound, Organization of Courts 136-40 (1940), wherein it is said:
Probate jurisdiction has involved much difficulty ... Two things were
unsatisfactory in the organization of this jurisdiction .... The judges were
usually elected for short terms and given small salaries .... As has been
seen, in some states equity powers were doled out piecemeal by statutes.
30. Mo. Const. art. V, § 25 (1945).
31. Senate Concurrent Resolutions No. 9, 67th General Assembly, I Senate
Journal 821, 822 (Mo. 1953).
32. Welch, Oliver, Jr. & Summers, supra note 12, at 115.
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ciples may be applied.' 33 Of this "vague abstraction" Professor At-
kinson observed, "On its face at least, proceeding like a court of equity
without being one seems to be a sort of apologetic play-acting.
3 4
Consideration of prior Missouri statutes and decisions is therefore
important in order to see what the 1955 General Assembly was at-
tempting to do with regard to the equitable powers of probate courts
when it undertook to enact a code "to meet the needs of modern
society."35
III. STATUTES AND DECISIONS BEFORE THE NEW CODE
Candor compels the recognition that frequently practical reasons,
though not assigned, were more sound than the legal reasons given
for judicial decisions denying probate court equitable jurisdiction.
Chief among these was the fact that in most counties the probate
judges were not required to be lawyers. Occasionally the opinion of
the appellate court bluntly disclosed that the impelling influence in
its judicial decision was its lack of confidence in the legal acumen
of the probate judge.3-
Categorical statements that under the previous law probate courts
did not have equity jurisdiction have resulted in extensive disharmony
in many judicial pronouncements and decisions, and they clash with
statutes as well as frequent practice to the contrary.
33. Note, Equitable Jurisdiction of Probate Courts and Finality of Probate
Decrees, 48 Yale L.J. 1273, 1277 (1939). Obviously how to apply "equitable
principles" without doing equity or granting equitable relief to somebody fre-
quently presents perplexing problems.
34. Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 183,
187 (1940).
35. Senate Concurrent Resolutions No. 9, 67th General Assembly, 1 Senate
Journal 821, 822 (Mo. 1953).
36. In First Baptist v. Robberson, 71 Mo. 326, 335 (1879), Judge Sherwood
declared that the powers invoked (construction of a will) were not within the
"scope" or "grasp" of the probate courts. In Caron v. Old Reliable Gold Mining
Co., 12 N.M. 211, 226, 78 Pac. 63, 67 (1904), the court expressed it even more
bluntly and pungently when it characterized a probate court of that state as "a
court that is not required to know any law, and that does not know any more than
the law requires." In Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 355 Mo. 1136, 1143, 199
S.W.2d 917, 920 (1947), the very able Judge Ellison, in holding that the General
Assembly had long ago (Mo. Rev. Stat. p. 113 [1825]) given to the circuit courts
concurrent jurisdiction of actions against decedents' estates and that the probate
court jurisdiction was not exclusive, commented: "The fact should be remem-
bered that while Art. V, Sec. 25 of the present Constitution of 1945 requires
probate judges to be licensed to practice law, that was not necessary under the
Constitution of 1875 and Secs. 1988 and 2444."
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
A. The Prior Statutes
The first codification of the probate statutes37 contained numerous
specific grants of equitable powers, many of which in substance
have been consistently retained to this day. An example in the first
codification was Section 76, which granted power to the probate
court to act "as fully as any court of chancery may or can do" with
respect to disobedience by executors and administrators of any order,
sentence or decree, including power to sequester lands and goods.
Sections 463.450-.500 of the 1949 code, granting jurisdiction to
the probate court over proceedings for the specific performance of a
deceased's written contract to sell real estate, have, in substance,
been on the statute books since January 12, 1822.38
Section 465.340 of the 1949 code, pursuant to which countless trus-
tees to collect notes and other assets not distributable in kind have
been appointed, supervised and discharged by the probate courts, has
been in effect since 1885.
Section 223 of the 1919 code39 provided that "The court shall, at
each settlement, exercise an equitable control in making executors and
administrators account for interest. . . ." The supreme court, in
Enright v. Sedalia Trust Co.,40 a case based on this statute, said,
through Henwood, C.:
And our appellate courts have held that cases of this character
are in the nature of equity cases and triable as such in the probate
court and the circuit court and upon appeal from the circuit
court. Perkins v. Silverman, 284 Mo. 238, 223 S. W. 895; Rash
v. Rash (Mo. App.) 256 S. W. 525. Accordingly, our considera-
tion of this case must be de novo, as in all equity cases.41
There were other old statutes which necessarily implied the exer-
cise of equitable jurisdiction in the collection and marshaling of a
decedent's property ;42 the management and operation of his business, 43
if deemed prudent, or of his interest in partnerships;4" the sale of a
decedent's real or personal property; 4" the relinquishment of his in-
37. Mo. Rev. Stat. pp. 92-125 (1825).
38. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 27 (1825), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 473.303-
.310 (1959).
39. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 465.080 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.550
(1959).
40. 323 Mo. 1043, 20 S.W.2d 517 (1929).
41. Id. at 1054, 20 S.W.2d at 521-22.
42. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ch. 462 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. Ch. 473
(1959).
43. 1 Limbaugh, Practice with Forms § 650 (1935).
44. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 461.650-.770 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. §§
473.220-.230 (1959).
45. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 463.010-.530 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. §§
472.100-473.533 (1959).
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terest in real estate; 46 the redemption of real or personal property ;47
the division of land into village or town lots;48 the cancellation of
decedent's contracts to sell lands;419 the partition of legacies not
divisible in kind ;10 and the trial of issues of waste.51 These amount to
jurisdiction over the winding up of the affairs of a decedent similar
to that of a court of general jurisdiction in receivership.
In fact, the very mechanics employed in requiring personal repre-
sentatives to file periodic or final settlements, in auditing the same, in
requiring vouchers for all expenditures, in "surcharging" a repre-
sentative, and in approving the account as filed or as surcharged, are
so identical to the methods by which a chancery court supervises the
accounts of a trustee, a receiver or other fiduciary appointed by it (and
so basically similar to the procedure followed in courts of bankruptcy,
which, incidentally, exercise a strictly "equitable" jurisdiction), that
it may be said that probate courts spend most of their time in pur-
suance of their equitable jurisdiction and a relatively small part in
pursuance of their "legal" powers, such as the hearing of disputed
money claims against estates.
B. The Decisions Under the Prior Statutes
In 1913 the supreme court en banc declared that,
There have been numerous rulings by the appellate courts of
Missouri to the effect that probate courts possess no equitable ju-
risdiction at all.... We find that the rule announced in some of
the foregoing cases goes rather too far in stripping probate courts
of all chancery powers .... 52
Some idea of conflicts which nevertheless thereafter continued may
be gained by four relatively recent cases involving discovery of assets
proceedings under Sections 473.340-.353. In each case the defense
was raised that the property sought to be recovered was trust
46. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 462.330 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.323
(1959).
47. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 462.360 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.287
(1959).
48. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 463.290 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.533
(1959).
49. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 463.440 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.277
(1959).
50. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 465.320 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.643
(1959).
51. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 465.200 (1949), now contained in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.590
(1959).
52. State ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 580, 162 S.W. 119, 122 (1913).
The court ruled that the probate court had no equitable jurisdiction to remove
a minor's guardian because the guardian's affiliation was different from that of
the minor's parents, since that was not a ground specified by the removal statute.
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property. In three of the cases the probate court was held or was
assumed to have jurisdiction of the matter. 3 In the fourth it was
held to lack jurisdiction."
A picture of the early judicial conflicts can be seen by a comparison
of the majority and dissenting opinions in First Baptist Church v.
Robberson.55 Judge Sherwood's majority opinion was bottomed upon
his view "that the powers invoked here" (construction of a will)
were not within the "scope" or "grasp" of the probate courts. 0
Judge Hough's dissent was based on the view that in probate matters
Missouri probate courts "possess about the same powers formerly
exercised in England by the ecclesiatical and chancery courts." 7 He
supported his view by citing decisions by the same court as early as
1835. Thereafter, in thirty or more cases involving various equitable
issues, the majority opinion was cited and followed. Others have
applied its doctrine and still others have departed therefrom,8 Forty-
three cases are cited in the Missouri Digest under the single heading,
"Probate Courts, Equitable Powers in General.!' - The continuing
controversies for over seventy-five years in themselves strongly sug-
gest uncertainty in the law, or perhaps confusion within the bar. The
cases have been so numerous that the limited discussion here will be
simply for the purpose of pointing up the existence of the conflicts,
uncertainty and confusion, and the need for legislative action.
We have seen that the statutes hereinbefore reviewed conferred on
probate courts powers which by their very nature were intrinsically
and exclusively "equitable." They were the very same powers for-
merly embraced within the general jurisdiction possessed by the
chancery courts of "control over" executors, administrators and
guardians5 The ecclesiastical courts had only the power to appoint,
no power to supervise.'1 Notwithstanding the historical source of
53. Masterson v. Plummer, 343 S.W.2d 352 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Covey v.
Van Bibber, 311 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); In re Geel's Estate, 143 S.W.2d
327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
54. State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 343 Mo. 580, 122 S.W.2d
909 (1938).
55. 71 Mo. 326 (1879).
56. Id. at 335.
57. Id. at 341.
58. For a collection of cases see Maus, 3 Missouri Practice § 505, at 462-65
(1960). In 1952 Maus expressed emphatic opposition to the movement for a new
probate code. Commentary on Missouri Probate law, 25 V.A.M.S. 327, 355-56(1st ed. 1949). Indisputably, the new code has rendered entirely obsolete much
of the former law, both statutory and judicial, covered by his extensive work.
59. 8 Mo. Dig. pp. 2-48 (1949).
60. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10 (1820).
61. 1 Woerner, American Law of Administration § 14, at 477-78; authorities
in Judge Hough's dissent in First Baptist Church v. Robberson, 71 Mo. 326, 350
(1879).
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those powers, the Missouri decisions, for a time, flatly denied that
probate courts had any equitable jurisdiction,62 and some of the cases
held that such courts could not even apply equitable principles in the
decision of matters legally before them.6 3 Other cases held to the
contrary, one of such declaring that "whatever would be a good de-
fense to an action on a claim brought in the circuit court is equally
good in a proceeding to establish the claim in a probate court."
6 4
Still another held that the probate court had jurisdiction to adjudicate
the equitable defenses of estoppel or laches 5 In principle, it is dif-
ficult to discern the difference between adjudicating an equitable
issue for the purpose of denying relief from that of adjudicating it
for the purpose of granting relief.
But it has been trust cases which have produced the greatest amount
of uncertainty and confusion. Sometimes the deceased was the al-
leged trustee and the action or proceedings were against the executor
or administrator. In other instances, the alleged trustee was a third
person and the executor or administrator brought the action or pro-
ceedings against him alleging that he was withholding assets of the
estate. In most of the cases the Missouri courts declared the probate
courts had no jurisdiction.6
However, it is also indisputable that many times appellate courts
have approved, tacitly or expressly, the exercise by probate courts
of equitable jurisdiction in trust cases. In 1895 the supreme court
in the Hoffmann case6 7 ruled that a probate court had jurisdiction of
a proceeding against a decedent's estate to enforce an antenuptial
agreement between decedent and his wife, and for an accounting of
trust funds held by him thereunder. Of the statutes granting probate
court jurisdiction, "upon any demand against the estate of the
testator or intestate," the court said,
This provision seems broad enough to include all money demands,
of whatever nature, whether legal or equitable; and so it was
held in Hammons v. Renfrow, 84 Mo. 341.... The probate court
62. Jenkins v. Morrow, 131 Mo. App. 288, 109 S.W. 1051 (1908); Ivie v. Ewing,
120 Mo. App. 124, 96 S.W. 481 (1906); In re Glover, 127 Mo. 153, 29 S.W. 982(1895).
63. See, e.g., In re Glover, supra note 62, which held that the court could not
adjudicate an equitable defense.
64. Evans v. York, 216 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948).
65. In re Thomson's Estate, 362 Mo. 1043, 246 S.W.2d 791 (1952).
66. The leading cases expounding this proposition are: Clay County State
Bank v. Waltner, 346 Mo. 1138, 145 S.W.2d 152 (1940); State ex rel. North St.
Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 343 Mo. 580, 122 S.W.2d 352 (1938) ; Orr v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 291 Mo. 383, 236 S.W. 642 (1921).
67. Hoffmann v. Hoffmann's Ex'r, 126 Mo. 486, 29 S.W. 603 (1895).
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had jurisdiction to hear and determine a money demand against
the executor of deceased, though it grew out of this trust rela-
tion.68
In 1920 the supreme court en bane in the Stetina case", quashed
a court of appeals opinion on the ground that it was in conflict with
Hoffmann. Regarding the claimant's claim in the probate court that
she had turned her earnings over to her deceased grandmother, who
had failed "to account to plaintiff for the balance in her hands," the
court of appeals had ruled that "the grandmother was the trustee of
an unsettled and unascertained trust cognizable only in equity ...
[and the probate] court has no equitable jurisdiction."70 The supreme
court en bane, speaking through Williams, J., concluded, "It is at once
apparent that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in direct conflict
with the above decision in the Hoffman [sic] case.1 71
Insofar as the capacity or power of a court to adjudicate the exis-
tence or nonexistence of a trust is concerned it would seem immaterial
whether the recovery sought is a money judgment as in Hoffmann,
Stetina and others, or property.
And in 1935, the supreme court, in Lolordo v. Lacy,1 held that the
probate court in a discovery proceeding had power to conduct an
accounting against a trustee in deeds of trust securing notes belonging
to the estate, and to compel him to pay to the estate the balance
remaining after various credits. The court said,
The relation of defendant to this estate was fiduciary. He ob-
tained the fund in question as a trustee.... [T] he summary pro-
ceeding to discover assets is a proper remedy to compel him to
pay the amount of the proceeds to the estate, and.., this remedy
is not "confined to a particular fund-the actual money which
belonged to the decedent." 73
When the new code was drafted, many cases, principally Wolfe,
Clay County Bank and Orr 7 4 were contrary to the decisions in Hoff-
mann, Stetina and Lolordo. In Wolfe,75 strongly relied upon in F rech,
decedent delivered to B a $5,000 HOLC bond, allegedly with instruc-
tions to deliver the same to C upon his death. It would seem that,
even before the new code, it would have been held that the probate
court had the power to decide such a simple issue as one growing out
68. Id. at 493, 29 S.W. at 605. (Emphasis added.)
69. State ex rel. Stetina v. Reynolds, 286 Mo. 120, 227 S.W. 47 (1920).
70. Id. at 123-24, 227 S.W. at 47.
71. Id. at 124, 227 S.W. at 48.
72. 337 Mo. 1097, 88 S.W.2d 353 (1935).
73. Id. at 1110-11, 88 S.W.2d at 360-61.
74. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
75. State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 343 Mo. 580, 122 S.W.2d
352 (1938).
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of the specifically conferred power (under the "discovery" statutes)
to determine whether any third person was "wrongfully withholding
any money or property belonging to the estate." However, the court
held that the parties had to go into the circuit court as a court of
equity to decide that simple issue, for the asserted reason that trusts
are essentially and exclusively of equitable cognizance and probate
courts have no jurisdiction to decide issues which are "purely equi-
cable." If that is so, then the en banc decision in the Stetin case was
wrong, but neither Wolfe nor Frech" criticized or even mentioned
Stetina. Neither did Wolfe mention Lolordo,77 but Frech did do so. 8
76. In re Frech's Estate, 347 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. 1961). Here the commissioner
recognized the rule succinctly stated in 2 Scott, Trusts § 198.2 (2d ed. 1956),
that "an action at law can be maintained by the beneficiary against him where
the trustee is under an immediate duty to transfer it and deliver . .. , if no
accounting is necessary." At the same time the commissioner relied upon the
Wolfe case which completely overlooked that rule. The commissioner, attempting
to bolster his opinion that the probate courts have no jurisdiction involving
equitable remedies, declared that if the trust were in fact revoked before the
executor died, an accounting would be necessary, the commissioner declaring
that the probate court had no jurisdiction to conduct an accounting. Was an
accounting required? Not only did the trustee bank say that the only issue was
whether the trust had been revoked, but it pleaded that as of July 20, 1959 the
assets in the trust "consisted of government and corporate bonds, and common
stocks in various corporations, as specifically set out in an exhibit attached to an-
swers of Mercantile Trust Co., to the interrogatories." (Brief for Appellant p. 5.)
Admittedly "the sole substantive issue in dispute is whether or not the trust
was revoked," as the trustee bank said in its brief (Brief for Respondent p. 11).
Furthermore it may be noted that probate courts constantly audit the accountings
of fiduciaries as trustees for heirs, legatees and creditors; metropolitan probate
courts maintain an experienced staff of auditors who do nothing but audit such
trustees' accounts.
77. Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 88 S.W.2d 353 (1935).
78. In re Frech's Estate, 347 S.W.2d 224, 229-30 (Mo. 1961). Of Lolordo the
commissioner said:
Appellant relies heavily upon Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 88 S.W.2d
353, in his contention that the probate court has jurisdiction. That case is not
controlling for at least three reasons. (1) The point that the court erred in
refusing to transfer the case to an equity division was not properly pre-
served for review, and therefore was not passed upon. (2) The trust was
completely terminated. (3) The trustee, upon receipt of the trust funds,
was under an immediate duty to turn them over to the administrator of
the estate to which they belonged.
As to (1), was not the question one of jurisdiction, not mere error? If the
probate court had no jurisdiction, the circuit court had none, its jurisdiction being
derivative and therefore did not the judgment of the supreme court in effect
necessarily approve the jurisdiction of the probate court. As to (2), how could
it be said that a trust is "completely terminated" when the trustee still held
the trust funds and claimed credit for 35 various alleged expenditures, eight
of which were disputed by the cestui que trust? As to (3), the "trust funds"
received by the trustee were the gross proceeds from the foreclosure sales; but
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Until the Barnes decision 7 9 several cases had held that probate
courts had exclusive jurisdiction of all claims against decedents'
estates "save in cases of equitable cognizance."' 0 Judge Ellison, in
ruling that the circuit court had concurrent jurisdiction with the
probate court of claims against decedents' estates, demonstrated the
fallacy of the holdings that probate court jurisdiction was exclusive.
Presently, in concurrent jurisdiction cases, the court in which such
actions are first filed has exclusive jurisdiction.,1 Upon the same
theory of concurrent jurisdiction, a pending first filed declaratory
judgment action in the circuit court alleging a justiciable controversy
would bar probate court jurisdiction of a subsequent action involving
the same issues, whether legal or equitable. Accordingly, the actual
decision in Clay County Bank2 might well have been based on that
ground without undertaking to pass on whether the probate court
could have had jurisdiction.
A frequent ground of denial of probate court jurisdiction has been
that the issues call for equitable accountings and that such account-
ings are beyond the scope of probate court jurisdiction. And yet the
supreme court approved the jurisdiction of the probate court in a
claim against the estate of a manager of claimant's branch office
which "contemplated an account, and a judgment for what might be
found due claimant upon such accounting.' 83 The supreme court
ordered the claim dismissed on the ground that it contemplated "a
complete accounting," whereas the amended claim filed in the circuit
court after appeal was based on only one hundred thirty specific items
of collections made by the deceased agent and hence, according to the
ruling, it constituted a departure.
The above is but a partial resume of the many conflicting and incon-
sistent decisions of the appellate courts on the subject of the probate
court's equitable jurisdiction up to the time of the adoption of the new
probate code. It is true that some broad principles before the new code
could be deduced from all these authorities. For example, a probate
court might apply equitable principles and might even pass upon
what were anciently regarded as "equitable" rights or titles, such as
obviously, the trustee was not only entitled, but was obliged to make many of
the payments therefrom for which he claimed credit, and to account therefor,
before turning over the balance to the cestui que trust. So it becomes difficult
to justify the attempted distinctions.
79. Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 335 Mo. 1136, 1142-43, 199 S.W.2. 917,
919 (1947).
80. Id. at 1143, 199 S.W.2d at 920.
81. Courier v. Scott, 336 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. 1960).
82. State ex rel. Clay County Bank v. Waltner, 346 Mo. 1138, 145 S.W.2d
152 (1940).
83. Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Bogie, 317 Mo. 972, 981, 298 S.W. 56, 60 (1927).
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the marshaling of assets, in the determination of matters specifically
entrusted to it for decision. Nonetheless, the application of such gen-
eral principles to given cases in controversy was difficult. The situa-
tion called for legislative clarification. Clearly there was need to
remove the disability which most of the cases asserted, this being the
lack of power in a probate court to issue such equitable writs and
other processes as would enable it to do "full justice" in any matter
of an equitable nature brought before it in pursuance of its constitu-
tional and statutory jurisdiction.
It would seem that the foregoing abstracts of prior cases, though
incomplete, are sufficient to indicate the picture which confronted the
1953 Joint Committee and the 1955 General Assembly when they
undertook to draft a new probate code.
IV. THE NEW STATUTES RELATING TO EQUITY JURISDICTION IN
MATTERS PERTAINING TO PROBATE BUSINESS
It must be assumed that the Joint Legislative Committee and the
1955 General Assembly knew of the conflicts and uncertainties in the
decisions; of the ever-continuing litigation over the equitable powers
of the probate court; of the frequent probate orders over the years
granting equitable relief, and usually accepted as valid. They knew
that the new code, to be truly effective concerning equitable jurisdic-
tion, had to contain broader provisions than those in the existing
probate legislation. They were also cognizant of the 1945 constitu-
tional requirement that probate judges be lawyers, and that broad eq-
uity powers would therefore not be beyond their "scope" or "grasp."
With these considerations in mind, they drafted Section 472.030 and
the other equitable statutes abstracted below. It would seem indispu-
table that the General Assembly intended thereby to grant that very
power which many of the cases heretofore pointed out held that the
court did not have. In short, if Section 472.030 should be held not to
change the former law, then such holding would simply delete from
the statute the words, "the same ...equitable powers .. .as the
circuit court has in other matters."
To accord with the foregoing intention of granting full equitable
powers in probate matters and in order to provide rules and pro-
cedures in certain circumstances, the General Assembly in 1955 and
1957 enacted many sections included in the discussion below; and in
1961 it enacted Section 456.2258- to implement the 1955 grant of
jurisdiction over testamentary trusts.
In Section 472.010 (4) "Claims" are defined to include all liabilities
of the decedent whether "in contract or in tort or otherwise."85
84. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.225 (Vernon's Supp. 1961).
85. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 472.010 (4) (Vernon's Supp. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
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Old Chapter 464 of the 1949 code, pertaining to "Demands," along
with all other sections of the old code, was repealed, and Sections
473.360, 473.367, and 473.403 s0 were enacted. These provide that the
probate and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction of all claims,
whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or
unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise. The italicized words
denote changes from former law.
Section 473.233-1 requires that the executor or administrator "shall
inventory" not only the property owned by the deceased, but "all
other property possessed by decedent at the time of his death."8 And
in subsection (7) it is provided:
All property possessed but not owned by the decedent at his
death shall be listed in the inventory, but separately from other
property, together with a statement as to the knowledge of the ex-
ecutor or administrator as to its ownership.,
To construe this section and section 473.357 as applying only to legal
ownership and not equitable ownership would ignore the words "all
other property possessed by decedent," and Section 472.010 (26) and
(27), which state that when used in the code, "'Property' includes
both real and personal property," and that "'Real property' includes
estates and interest in land,... legal or equitable." 8' 9 Sometimes de-
ceased individuals held property as life tenants or in trust,9' without
any record thereof except that of the deceased. Obviously, the General
Assembly believed it to be in the public interest to require that the
administrator or executor publicly disclose in the probate court the
extent and description of such property, and also his knowledge con-
cerning its ownership, legal or equitable. It also provided a probate
court procedure designed to aid in the protection of cestuis que trus-
86. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 473.360, 473.367, 473.403 (1959).
87. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.233-1 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
88. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.233-1 (7) (1959). (Emphasis added.)
89. This is not to infer that the definition of § 472.010 was intended to exclude
an equitable interest in personal property. To the contrary, for it would not
make sense to include equitable interests in realty and exclude such interests
in personalty. This is particularly true in view of the old cases which stated that
the probate court had no jurisdiction to "try" title to real estate, when no such
statement ever appeared with reference to personalty. Therefore, since equitable
interests in land are specifically included, a fortiori equitable interests in per-
sonalty are included. Section 472.010 is, for the most part, an enactment of § 3
of the Model Probate Code, and undoubtedly equitable interests were included
in the "real property" definition by the drafters of the code, because these were
the interests which had long been the subject of judicial controversy. They were
aware, for example, of cases holding that there could be no dower in equitable
interests in land, and they wanted to be sure that "real property" in the Model
Code did include such interests.
90. E.g., relatives, minors, charities, etc.
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tent and remaindermen of life tenancies, or bailors. It is believed that
many such beneficiaries never receive or even learn of their rights in
property which perhaps has become commingled by a deceased trustee,
life tenant or bailee.
Section 473.357 provides the procedure for the determination by the
probate court of the ownership of any personal property in the cus-
tody of an executor or administrator and the giving of appropriate
relief. ," The ownership contemplated by this section was either legal
or equitable.
Sections 473.287, 473.290, 473.387 and 474.450, enacted in 1955,
prescribe new statutory rules for the exercise by the probate court of
its equitable jurisdiction in marshaling assets and determining the
funds from which various types of creditors are to be paid. In
adjudging such questions prior to the new code, the mandate of
Section 464.080 of the 1949 code, regarding secured claims, frequently
proved so inequitable that inconsistent judicial decisions resulted
which themselves proved so inadequate 92 that they caused the 1955
General Assembly to enact the four above-mentioned new sections
authorizing the probate court to grant the equitable relief indicated by
the circumstances. It may be noted that these sections authorize
determination of various equitable issues and the granting of equitable
relief by the probate court, including, inter alia, exoneration of liens
under various circumstances to be determined upon hearings; the
various issues regarding equities of redemption; the making, after
hearing, of such orders in the premises as may be necessary to pre-
serve the rights of the parties: (1) where property owned by one
other than deceased is pledged to secure the debt of deceased; (2)
where property owned by one of tenants by the entirety or of joint
tenants is pledged and the other is not a principal debtor; and (3)
where a life insurance policy is pledged as collateral.
Section 473.377 of the 1955 code substantively amended Section
464.090 of the 1949 code. It relates to those actions in probate matters
in which the circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Before the
amendment the section read:
If any person commences suit of any kind in the circuit court
against an estate, within six months from the date of administra-
tion, he may recover judgment but shall be adjudged to pay all
costs; provided, this section shall not apply to suits in equity.93
91. It may be noted that in order to avoid non-compliance with due process
requirements, the legislature in 1959 deleted the words in the 1955 supplement,
"in a summary manner."
92. See annotated cases following V.A.M.S. § 464.080 (1949).
93. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 464.090 (1949). (Emphasis added.)
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The new code changed such section by substituting for the italicized
proviso clause the limitation that, "This section does not apply to suits
not cognizable in the probate court."0 14
It must be apparent that the reason for the deletion of the words
"provided, this section shall not apply to suits in equity," was that the
new code was both expressly and impliedly authorizing suits in
equity in the probate court in matters pertaining to probate business.
The amendment was obviously intended to make the section apply only
to suits "not cognizable in the probate court" for some reason other
than that it was a suit in equity.9 5
Section 472.020 specifically provided that the probate court shall
have "jurisdiction of the construction of wills as an incident to the
administration of estates,"'98 not merely as an incident to an order
of distribution. This provision was included because reflection made
it apparent that very frequently it was essential to the administration
of an estate that a will be construed and orders based upon that
construction be made long before orders of distribution.
Section 472.020 expressly, but only generally as enacted in 1955,
provided for probate court jurisdiction of the administration of testa-
mentary trusts. In 1961, implementing such express grant, the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted Senate Bill No. 48,97 now Section 456.225,8 em-
powering the probate court before rendering any decree of partial
or final distribution of bequests or devises in trust to certain trustees,
to require such trustees to file bond, and to require all testamentary
trustees to file accountings in the probate court upon the petition of
any beneficiary. The 1961 act further provides that the jurisdiction
of the probate court over testamentary trusts shall be the same as
and concurrent with that of the circuit court, but that an interested
party may, upon motion, require any proceeding in the probate court
which involves the administration of such trust to be transferred to
the circuit court, and there to be proceeded upon as if a probate court
judgment had been appealed. While doubts as to constitutionality
of this section have been expressed, many believe that if the question
is adequately briefed in an appropriate case, the section will be held
constitutional, on the theory that the General Assembly has the power
to define what is a "matter pertaining to probate business," as long
as its definition does not do violence to reason; and further, that the
devolution of property to the ultimate beneficiaries of a testator's
94. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.377 (1959).
95. E.g., actions, whether legal or equitable, against an administrator, and
another defendant over whom there was no ground for probate court jurisdiction.
96. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 472.020 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
97. 71st Mo. General Assembly (1961).
98. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.225 (Vernon's Supp. 1961).
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bounty may properly be determined by the General Assembly to be a
matter pertaining to probate business. Many states have, in varying
degrees, granted to probate courts jurisdiction of testamentary
trusts.9
Section 473.230 provides that the probate court may, in certain
circumstances, "appoint a receiver of the partnership estate with like
powers and duties of receivers in chancery." 00
Section 473.223 provides that "the probate court whenever it ap-
pears necessary may order the surviving partner to account to the
court."10' This and other new partnership sections clearly widen the
pre-existing equitable jurisdiction of the probate courts over partner-
ship estates.
Section 474.200 empowers the probate court to approve an election
by a guardian for his ward to take against the will of a deceased
spouse, whereas under prior law only a court of equity could authorize
such election. 0 2
Section 475.130 grants to a guardian "under supervision of the
court" the same general powers over his ward's estate as a receiver.
Section 475.110 authorizes a probate court, upon petition of a
fourteen year old ward, to remove a guardian and appoint another if
it is found to be for the best interests of the ward, whereas under
prior law it was held that the court had no such equitable power.10 3
It would seem that the judiciary would interpret the new statutes
in the light of the factors which prompted their enactment. Should
it any longer be declared, in the face of the foregoing changes and
provisions in the new code, that the probate courts, while empow-
ered to "apply equitable principles," do not have full equity power in
all matters pertaining to probate business over which statutes have
granted general jurisdiction?
V. SUMMARY AND RATIONALE OF THE SUBJECT
Summarizing:
(1) In England, before the reform legislation of 1857, probate
jurisdiction was divided as follows: (a) The ecclesiastical courts
issued letters authorizing administration on personalty only and could
do "little or nothing more in the way of judicial proceedings," except
99. Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin.
100. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.230 (1959).
101. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.223 (1959).
102. In re Connor's Estate, 254 Mo. 65, 80, 162 S.W. 252, 256 (1914).
103. State ex rel. Baker v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569, 162 S.W. 119 (1913).
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at one time to require a bond and inventory ;204 devises of land were
effective without probate of the will."0 5 (b) The Common law courts
had no jurisdiction in probate matters, except that they could try
ejectment, trespass, replevin or trover actions. 00 (c) The chancery
courts had jurisdiction of all other probate matters.10
(2) The Missouri legislature was not compelled, under any of the
constitutions in force since statehood, to confer all the equity powers
formerly exercised by the separate chancery courts upon the circuit
courts. It could separate those powers, and grant certain equitable
powers to the probate courts. This is what the legislature attempted
to do under the previous statutes granting jurisdiction to the probate
courts over probate matters which originally had come under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the chancery court. This was sometimes done
specifically and expressly, but more often generally and by implication.
(3) Despite these legislative grants of power, from at least 184300
to 1955 there was such a conflict of views as to the extent of equitable
jurisdiction properly exercisable by the probate courts in Missouri
that a stream of judicial decisions resulted. They were far from
harmonious, many of the cases reflecting the reluctance and unwilling-
ness of the appellate courts to attribute "equitable" powers to lay
or non-lawyer probate judges. There seemed to be no end to the
litigation involving jurisdiction of issues as to claimed trusts.
(4) In order to end that uncertainty, the legislature in 1955 pro-
vided, by Section 472.030, that the probate court should have plenary
equity powers in all matters properly before it; that is, all matters
over which it had statutory jurisdiction. The result of this enactment
is that we have only to look to the statutes to determine whether the
probate court is given general jurisdiction of the class of cases in-
volved. If the court has such "general" jurisdiction, it then follows
that it may fully adjudicate the matter, even to the granting of such
relief as anciently was regarded as "equitable" in character.
(5) Applying this rule to trusts, as heretofore noted, the new code
specifically provides that the estate inventory shall list "all property
possessed but not owned by the decedent"loO and that any person
claiming to own any property "in the possession of the executor or
administrator" may file a formal petition in the probate court to
determine ownership. These provisions, in conjunction with the
104. Simes & Basye, The Organization of The Probate Courts in America, 42
Mich. L. Rev. 965, 970 (1944).
105. Id. at 971.
106. Id. at 971-72.
107. Id. at 972-74.
108. Miller v. Woodward, 8 Mo. 169 (1843).
109. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.233 (7) (1959).
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claims statutes 10 and Section 472.030 seem broad enough to cover any
type of proceeding to recover assets held in trust by a decedent, to
allow the probate court to conduct an accounting to determine any
liability of the decedent, to allow his estate any compensation to which
he was entitled and to adjust all other matters of charge or credit.
As to claims asserted by the estate against third persons, Section
473.263 requires the executor or administrator to take possession of
all personal property of the decedent, except exempt property. By
Sections 473.340-.353, the probate courts are given statutory juris-
diction over proceedings to recover property wrongfully withheld
from the estate.- If an accounting or other "equitable" determina-
tion is required, Section 472.030 gives the probate courts the same
equitable power to effectuate its general jurisdiction over all probate
matters, including the recovery of assets wrongfully withheld from an
estate, as the circuit court has in other matters.
(6) Nearly all the controversies which will arise will involve simple
claimed trusts terminating before or upon decedent's death. Usually,
no complicated accounting is necessary in such a case. Why should
the parties be compelled to go to the circuit court to secure that simple
determination of whether there was or was not a trust, and, if so,
whether it had been terminated? But if an accounting is necessary,
are not the probate courts (particularly in the metropolitan areas,
with their permanent staffs of auditors, whose sole duties are in the
accounting field) better equipped to conduct it than the circuit courts,
which ordinarily can perform such functions only through the ap-
pointment of a referee? And if a party is dissatisfied with the probate
court determination, an appeal to the circuit court can ordinarily be
heard as soon as an action originally filed there, or sooner if the
court advances hearings on appeals. What good is done by a rule
denying probate court jurisdiction in such cases? Whom does it
benefit? The decisions denying jurisdiction under the old code bene-
fited no one, except perhaps when, by the time of the decisions, laches
had intervened to bar a suit in the circuit court.
110. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 472.010 (4), 473.360, 473.367, 473.403 (1959).
111. One or two opinions have argued that because the discovery statutes
permit a trial of the issues by a jury the discovery proceeding is therefore an
"action at law" and cannot be used to try "equitable" issues. This argument
fails, since the Missouri discovery of assets proceeding is one peculiar to the
statute law. It cannot trace its ancestry exclusively either to the ancient
chancery or common-law courts. The legislature, in its wisdom, could and did
provide for a jury trial, as it has with respect to other proceedings involving
"equitable" issues, e.g., the so-called lunacy determinations (Section 475.075).
Under Section 472.030 the probate court can now determine any "equitable"
issues, without the intervention of a jury, as fully as the circuit court can, as, for
example, in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
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(7) There is nothing sacrosanct about the circuit court's jurisdic-
tion over trusts. It is common knowledge that probate courts have
from time immemorial rendered decrees adjudicating that executors
or administrators relinquish personal property that had been held by
the decedent in trust for third persons. Prior to the new code the
only way a trustee could secure in the circuit court an effective
acquittance for delivery of such trust assets (except where Sections
456.110, 456.130, 456.180, 456.190, 456.200 or 456.210 are applicable)
would be to refuse to turn over such assets to the person rightfully
entitled to them, and for such person then to file a suit in the circuit
court to compel delivery, or for an interested party to file a suit
presenting a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 12 Is there any sound reason for requiring such "a full dress"
adversary proceeding when the matter may ordinarily be easily and
properly disposed of by a simple proceeding in the probate court?
CONCLUSION
If this article has demonstrated that the oft-repeated assertions
that probate courts do not possess "equitable" jurisdiction are in-
correct and misleading, it will have served its major function. It is
also hoped, however, that it will have the added effect of recalling
the goal of all modern probate legislation-the administration of
estates quickly, economically and with finality. Experience, in Mis-
souri as elsewhere, abundantly indicates that this goal cannot be fully
attained unless the probate tribunal has plenary powers and juris-
diction; that is, the power to decide all probate matters.
Missouri's 1955 code, which attempts to invest probate courts with
such jurisdiction, is a significant step forward toward the objective.
112. McHaney, Probate Administration of Testamentary Trusts, in Missouri
Estate Administration 322 (1960); Overstreet, Appointment of Successor Trus-
tees, Trust Administration and Settlements in Missouri, 13 Mo. L. Rev. 269
(1948). In State ex rel. Chilcott v. Thatch, 221 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Mo. 1949), the
court speaking through Judge Conkling held: "No justiciable controversy exists
and no justiciable question is presented unless an actual controversy exists .... "
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EQUITY JURISDICTION
Whether it will meet with success depends upon the extent to which
the courts will sanction the legislative intent. The Frech case
indicates that there is serious cause for concern.13
113. The St. Louis court of appeals, on Nov. 27, 1961, adopted the opinion of
Commissioner Doerner in Stark v. Moffit, No. 30848, which ruled that the circuit
court had exclusive jurisdiction of the action and that,
plaintiff's prior claim in the Probate Court does not involve the same parties
nor the same subject matter as the action subsequently filed by him in the
Circuit Court; and that the Probate Court does not have jurisdiction to
render the particular relief sought in this action.
The "prior claim" was, of course, against only the decedent's estate. The
defendants in the circuit court action included (in addition to an administrator
d/b/n, c/t/a) the administrator individually, a Milling Corporation, the Farmers
Bank, another individual and "Escrow Fund in Farmers Bank." The plaintiff's
petition alleged that the executrix of the estate of deceased Moffit entered into
a contract with the Milling Company and the Bank providing that the executrix
should sell certain hogs for cash, deposit the sales proceeds with the bank which
was to hold the proceeds in escrow "until the final determination of the liens
and other claims on said hogs." The petition also alleged that $4,425 of said
escrow fund represented the proceeds of the sale of hogs which belonged to the
plaintiff. The opinion states that, "According to plaintiff's petition, each of the
defendants, for one reason or another, is contending that he has an interest in or
a lien on the escrow fund."
Clearly, there is no basis whatsoever for questioning the correctness of the
actual decision in the Stark case or its above-quoted ruling; for no statute pur-
ports to give to the probate court jurisdiction of an action against multiple
defendants to determine conflicting interests in property which is not in possession
of the administrator. As pointed out above (see text accompanying notes 93 & 94
supra), action like the Stark action is what caused the 1955 legislature (when
greatly widening the equity jurisdiction of probate courts) to enact § 473.377,
amending § 464.090 of the 1949 Statutes, by deleting, "this section shall not
apply to suits in equity," and substituting in lieu thereof, "This section does
not apply to suits not cognizable in the probate court"--for some reason other
than that it was a suit in equity. E.g., actions, legal or equitable, against an
administrator and another defendant over whom there was no statutory ground
for probate jurisdiction.
But, unfortunately, the Stark opinion contains much dicta, citing the Frech
case, and Wolfe and similar cases dealing with probate court equitable jurisdic-
tion before the new code.
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